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Abstract  If  Socrates  cannot  show  that  the  apparent  meaning  of  Apollo’s  pronouncement  – that 
no one is wiser than he – is  inconsistent  with  the  god’s  otherwise  infallible  wisdom,  Socrates  will  
have reasons for doubting his own claim to lack such wisdom and for accepting the indictments 
brought against him. At his trial, Socrates argues that he has shown this, that he has refuted 
Apollo, but the jury, ironically, disagrees and convicts him of impiety. 
 
 
 It has been argued about Plato’s  early  dialogues  that  Socrates is made there to privilege 
beliefs   derived   from   “information” he receives through certain forms of divination. These 
beliefs, the argument continues, are allowed to supplement   Socrates’   elenctically   established 
human  knowledge  while  remaining  “logically  independent”  of  it.1 Such a view is needed, some 
believe, to solve the paradox that, while Socrates disavows knowledge of anything great or 
small, he is nonetheless and thoroughly convinced that his life is morally unimpeachable. 
Socrates, who claims his distinction   is   “not   to   think   he   knows  what   he   does   not   know”   also 
swears, without reservation, that he has never willingly done injustice to anyone and believes 
that he is justified in continuing to do just those things for which he is brought to trial.2  He 
cannot consistently know his life is morally unimpeachable, yet he continues to live and treat 
others as if he can. Socrates will also claim that wrongdoing is the result of ignorance (AP 37a5-
                                                 
1 See Brickhouse and Smith (1984) 128 and (1986) 520ff. The point is reiterated in McPherran (1986) 
300 and 303. A separate argument against this view is taken up by Vlastos (1988) 11ff. 
2 For disavowals of knowledge see AP 21b4-5, d5-6, 23a, 29b2-6, as well as EU 5a3-b7, LA 186b1-c1, LY 
212a4-7, HMA 286c8-d3, HMI 372d2-e1, GOR 509a4-7. For the claims he has never done injustice and is 
justified in his practice of philosophy see AP 37a5-6, b2-5, and AP 28b5-9, 29d2-e3. Throughout this 
essay,  the  standard  abbreviations  for  Plato’s  dialogues are used. 
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6 and 37b2-3, GOR 488a2-4 and 521c7-d4) implying that virtue follows from knowledge.3 These 
apparent conflicts can be explained, on the argument introduced above, by Socrates’  confidence  
in divine signs which, while failing to secure the knowledge Socrates is seeking in answers to his 
“What  is F?”  questions,  gives  him  the  warrant he requires to hold the beliefs he does.4 
 This warrant could be substantively challenged if it turned out that Socrates also believes 
these divine signs themselves may be subject to elenctic refutation. If he were, as those who 
make the argument abbreviated above say   he   is,   “certain   that   divinations, properly construed, 
provide   truth”   and  “certain   that  god  has  made  his  wishes  known   to  him,”5  Socrates could not 
reasonably undertake to refute or test what the god has said. There are good reasons, however, 
for supposing that Socrates does think he can cross-examine the god and that he does put Apollo 
himself to the elenctic test. These reasons derive from a passage in the Apology that gives a 
questionable  impression  of  Socrates’  reverence  for  divine  communications6 and seems to provide 
enough evidence for the claim that Socrates makes it his mission to refute or question what 
Apollo says.7 
For a long time I was at a loss about what in the world [the god] could mean. Then with great 
reluctance I turned to an examination of him in the following way. I went to one of those men 
reputed to be wise thinking that here if anywhere I would refute  the  god’s  response  (elenxôn to 
manteion) and declare to the oracle (apophanôn tô chrêsmô),  “This  man   is  wiser than me, but 
you  said  I  [was  wiser].”8 (AP 21b7-c2)    
 I show, here, contrary to what is expected, that Socrates does refute Apollo or, rather, that 
Socrates performs   an   elenchus   on   the   god’s pronouncement, and that this elenctic test sheds 
important  light  on  the  meaning  and  function  of  “refutation”  in  Socratic  argumentation.9 Socrates 
“refutes” Apollo, not because, as is the case with his interrogations of interlocutors generally, he 
shows the  god’s  beliefs  are inconsistent but because testing his own beliefs about what the god’s  
                                                 
3 See Benson (2000) 242-3. 
4 Brickhouse and Smith (1984) 128. 
5 Brickhouse and Smith (1984) 128 and (1986) 523-25. 
6 Burnet  (1970,  92)  goes  so  far  as  to  claim  that  Socrates,  if  reluctantly,  sets  out  “to  prove  the  god  is  a  liar.” 
7 On  Socrates’  “mission” see Brickhouse and Smith (1983), Stokes and McPherran (2002, n.1). 
8 All translations from the Greek are my own and compared with the authorities collected by Cooper. 
9 Cf. Carpenter and Polansky, Benson (2000, 2002), Brickhouse and Smith (2002). 
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pronouncement means proves to be the operative sense in which the god himself can be 
“refuted.” So that what Socrates hopes to exhibit through his examinations of the politicians, 
poets and artisans is just that, since there is someone wiser than Socrates, he has reasons for 
believing the god means something other than what he appears at first to say. If the apparent 
meaning of Apollo’s   pronouncement   cannot   be   shown   to   be   inconsistent   with   the   god’s  
otherwise infallible wisdom, Socrates will have reasons for doubting his own claim to lack such 
wisdom. Important consequences would follow from this failed refutation. 
  One important consequence would be that in the long course of the examinations of his 
fellow Athenians that follow from  this  testing  of  the  god’s  pronouncement,  Socrates’  long-held 
belief that he is wise in nothing at all is false. If that belief is false, then the consistency of his 
beliefs,  the  basis  for  Socrates  testing  the  consistency  of  his  interlocutor’s  beliefs,  is  undermined.  
Another important consequence would be that Socrates would be more vulnerable to the charges 
made against him. In fact, Socrates’  belief  about his own ignorance appears at first inconsistent 
with the manifest ignorance of all those Socrates interrogates. His examinations show rather that 
he really is wise (AP 20d8-9) and in fact wiser than the others he examines insofar as he alone 
among those he examines does not say he knows what he does not know. This result seems to 
confirm  the  god’s  pronouncement about him, but Socrates finds a way to salvage his own belief 
(that he does not know) by recasting what he believes the  god’s  message means. Socrates must 
do this because rejecting one of his beliefs, especially the belief that he is not wise, would be 
tantamount to questioning the consistency of the established set of beliefs that make him who he 
is.10 Socrates staves off this threat to his very identity by interpreting the oracular response in a 
way that leaves the consistency of his beliefs and his ethical identity intact. 
 Following this line of reasoning, we can say there is no reason to privilege divine 
communications   in   Socrates’   case. They cannot serve as premises for anything conclusive or 
convincing for Socrates since they are always subject to questioning and since their wisdom will 
always be tested against the consistency of beliefs already held by Socrates. And since the only 
                                                 
10 See the consistency thesis argued for by Vlastos (1984) and reconstructed in my   “Certainty   and  
Consistency   in  the  Socratic  Elenchus.” On my view, since there is no certain foundation for the beliefs 
Socrates holds, since what holds these beliefs together is just their mutual fit with one another, then a 
change in any one belief changes the structure of the whole into which any one of these beliefs may fit. 
This  account  is  part  of  an  argument  for  a  “non-foundational”  reading  of  the  Socratic elenchus. 
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test Socrates knows is the elenchus, we can conclude that, for Socrates, the pronouncements of 
gods and men alike, without exception, will be subject to his elenctic examinations.  
 From Apology 21b-23c Socrates undertakes, as he says (AP 21b1-2), to explain 
(didaxein) how the false accusations in the informal indictment came to be attached to him. The 
accusations are   that   Socrates,   “a   wise   man,” meddles   in   “matters   meteorologic,”   examines  
everything under the earth, and makes the weaker argument the stronger (AP 18b7-c1). Here, 
Socrates tells the familiar story of his interrogations of anyone he or anyone else may think is 
wise, conducting these examinations, he says, kata ton theon,   “as   befits   the   god”   (AP 21a4, 
23b5). But how are we to understand this? According to Socrates, he began these examinations 
only  after  hearing  the  report  about  Chaerephon’s  inquiry of Apollo at Delphi.11 The activity that 
engages him the rest of his life, in one way or another,  follows  from  the  oracle’s  pronouncement 
that no one is wiser than Socrates. Socrates’ immediate response to that oracle would appear to 
exhibit something less than reverence for what otherwise sanctions the way of life that makes 
Socrates outstanding among his peers. 
Upon hearing these things [sc,  the  oracle’s report] I  thought  to  myself:    “whatever  can  the  god  be 
saying?  and why does he speak in riddles (ainittetai)?” (AP 21b2-4)   
We  notice   immediately   that  Socrates’   first thoughts here are not about the implications 
bound to follow from this divine revelation. Rather, Socrates wastes no time in questioning what 
in the world the god could be saying. And if what the oracle means to say is not obvious to 
Socrates,   it   can   only   be   because   it’s   apparent   meaning   – that no one is wiser than he -- is 
inconsistent with something Socrates already believes to be true about himself, namely, that he is 
not wise at all. The apparent truth of the oracle is clearly not taken for granted by Socrates 
independently of some interrogation. This point is too often overlooked  in  the  case  of  Socrates’  
“divine   signs.”12 In general, what   is   “signed”  by these portents must be divined by the one to 
whom it will become significant. They mean nothing on their own, and the case of   Delphi’s  
pronouncement on Socrates’   wisdom   appears no different in this respect. Socrates indicates 
                                                 
11 There  is,  however,  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  elenctic  style  of  Socrates’  examinations  precedes  this  
event.  See n. 15 below. 
12 Vlastos (1991, 280-1,   citing  Riddell   (102)  points   out   how   references   to  Socrates’   daimonion (at AP 
31c8-d1, for example) are contractions for the fuller daimonion sêmeion,  and  so  “divine  sign”  and  not  as  
Nussbaum  has  it  (1986,  234)  “divine  thing.”  The  complete  expression  can  be  found  at  EUD 272e3-4 ( to 
eiôthos sêmeion daimonion) and PHDR 242b8-9 (to eiôthos kai daimonion sêmeion). 
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clearly that he is perplexed about what the god may be indicating here. Moreover, he appears to 
file a complaint   about   the  god’s   style  of  pronouncement. The god speaks in a riddle, but why 
should this surprise much less bother Socrates when it was not at all unusual for the oracle to 
respond in the form of a proverb or enigmatic story (ainos)?13 Why should he (or we) be 
suspicious when the god communicates in terms that are not immediately obvious to humans? 
 One reason Socrates might have for his uncertainty about the oracle could come from his 
awareness of the procedures for soliciting advice from Delphi. The god, Apollo, speaking 
through his priestess, answered just those questions put to him by inquirers ritually purified 
through sacrifice who   also  made   a   “donation”   or   paid   a   tribute to him. The priestess herself, 
exhibited in an intoxicated state of emotional frenzy meant to confirm her possession by the god, 
was put the question by a male prophet who received it from the inquirers and who interpreted 
the  Pythia’s  response   in  verses  as   required.14 Thus,  Apollo’s advice  about  Socrates’  wisdom  is  
mediated by rituals of purification, a tribute, the   Pythia’s   intoxication,   the   prophet’s  
interpretation of the   priestess’   utterance,   and   the manner of question put to Apollo by 
Chaerephon. While Socrates might have no reasons for questioning the ritual practices of the 
oracle, he might wonder about Chaerephon’s   motivations   for   putting   such   a   question   to the 
god.15 Would the god have given the same response to a similar question differently put by 
someone other than Chaerephon?16 
                                                 
13 Oxford Classical Dictionary 323 and 924. 
14 H.W. Parke and E.W. Wormell, 35ff. A less dramatic and more economical scenario, attributed to Paul 
Amandry (33, 245), has the Pythia merely drawing white and black beans to respond to questions 
admitting of yes and no answers. The support for this view depends on the claimed historical accuracy of 
Xenophon’s  account  of this same incident (see n. 15 below). But Guthrie (406, n. 2) doubts this claim can 
be substantiated. I am grateful to Gregory Vlastos for this reference. 
15 Xenophon (Apologia Sôkratous, 14) confirms the report that Chaerephon solicited such a response from 
the oracle at Delphi but describes the content of his question, on the authority of Hermogenes, as whether 
anyone was more free, more just, or more temperate (sôphronesteron). Burnet suggests that Socrates must 
have had a reputation for sophia by the time he was thirty and implies that this motivated Chaerephon to 
make his inquiry (1970, 90-91). Socrates, in fact, is made by Plato to   remark   on   Chaerephon’s   well  
known impetuosity (AP 21a5), and at Charmides 153b2, Plato  has  him  observe,  “and  Charephon,  as  if  he  
were  a  madman”  (Chairephôn de, hate kai manikos ôn).  See Burnet (1970, 90) and McPherran (2002, n. 
1). 
16 Why does Chaerephon   ask   just   this   question?   Wouldn’t   the   implication   have   been   significantly  
different   if   he   had   asked   just,   “Is   Socrates   wise?”  Would   it   have   been   inconsistent   for   the   oracle   to  
respond  negatively  to  the  question,  “Should  Socrates  be  banished?”  and  affirmatively to Chaerephon that 
“No  one  is  wiser  than  Socrates”?  And  what  is  the  effect,  if  any,  of  the  prophet’s  putting  the  question  to  
the  Pythia  rather  than  the  suppliant  himself?  My  point  is  that  the  god’s  oracle  is  always  determined  by  the  
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 Socrates’   principle   concern, however, is more likely that   if   the   god’s   meaning is not 
enigmatic, he will be forced to reconsider his own evaluation of his claim to wisdom. 
For I am aware (sunoida) of being wise in nothing great or small. (AP 21b4-5)   
Contrary to what Chaerephon may have believed, nothing about his life up to this point 
had led Socrates to think that he had any special capacity regarding wisdom.17 Yet if what the 
god says is true as it appears to be from what is communicated to Chaerephon, then Socrates will 
be forced to give up either the belief that he knows nothing or the belief that the god knows what 
he is talking about.18 As it stands, he has no reason yet to give up the former and good reason to 
question the latter, reasons he would adduce from precisely those beliefs which have led him to 
this point to believe he knows  “nothing  great  or  small.”  So he sets out to examine and test this 
saying of the god, but clearly Socrates cannot examine or test the god himself. He can call into 
question only beliefs about what the god means when he says no one is wiser than Socrates. 
There would appear, then, to be at least one reason why Socrates cannot refute Apollo. 
 Moreover, some would argue that there is at least one more important impediment to 
construing Socrates’  examination  of  the  oracle  as  a testing or refutation. Just prior to describing 
                                                                                                                                                             
question asked and that every question necessarily asks for a certain kind of answer, even excludes some 
answers  in  preference  of  others.    Compare  Taylor’s  remarks  (77-8). 
17 Burnet (1970, 91) points to the respect of Parmenides and Protagoras exhibited in the dialogues named 
for them as evidence that Socrates had reasons to claim extraordinary wisdom (PA 127c5, PR 361e2). In 
Charmides, he has just returned from the battle at Potidaea after being away long enough to have to ask 
about the young men at Athens, who among them stood out in beauty and wisdom. If we accept the 
speculation (Burnet 1970, 120) that Socrates participated in the Delian campaign (BCE 424) but not the 
battle at Amphipolis (BCE 422), and it seems likely that Socrates would have been able to act on 
Chaerephon’s   testimony   only   after   his   return   to   “civilian”   life,   he   would   have   begun   his   famous  
interrogations in roughly his 46th year. This dating corroborates with the first appearances of Socrates in 
dramatae personae in   Aristophanes’   Clouds and Ameipsias’   Konnos both produced in BCE 423. 
McPherran  (2002,  n.1),  with  “most  scholars,”  “acknowledging   the  paucity  of  good  evidence,”  prefers  a  
date closer to BCE 430, citing the same text (AP 28d10-29a1)  that  is  the  basis  for  Burnet’s  speculations. 
18 According to Burnet (1970, 92), the Athenians were short on respect for Pythian Apollo because of its 
favor for their worst enemies (the Persians, the Spartans, and later Philip). This is the reason Burnet says 
no  one  would  object  to  Socrates’  attempt  to  prove  the  oracle was lying.  This of course supposes that the 
oracle did on occasion tell the truth, and the only grounds for such a claim could be that the Pythia was 
truly the mouthpiece for Apollo. Socrates himself, as we are about to see, is loath to believe that the god 
could be lying. To explain those cases where the oracle gave suspect advise it seems safe to speculate that 
on  those  occasions  this  was  not  the  god  speaking  at  all  but  prophets  “on  the  take.” 
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how he will undertake to refute the god (AP 2b7-c2), Socrates expresses his doubt that what the 
oracle says can be false. 
For certainly [the god] is not lying. It is not right (themis) for him [to do so]. (AP 21b6-7)   
An elenchus cannot begin, the argument goes, by presuming that the belief to be tested is 
true. However ironically Socrates may lead his interlocutors into believing he takes their 
propositions to be true until proven inconsistent, the only reason Socrates attempts to refute those 
propositions is because they do not square with beliefs he holds himself.19 The truth of the 
interlocutor’s   beliefs   is   suspect   from   the   start precisely because it is inconsistent with beliefs 
Socrates has elenctic reasons for claiming as his own. In this case, however, even if it is not 
expected that the god would lie (a belief Socrates may hold uniquely among his peers), it does 
not follow that what he and others believe to be the meaning of the   god’s   oracle cannot be 
questioned or tested. My argument is that we can hold, at the same time, that Socrates performs 
an elenchus on the pronouncement of Apollo and successfully refutes beliefs about the apparent 
meaning of that pronouncement without implying it is false or that the god is a liar. 
 There is, in addition, yet another difficulty in reading  Socrates’ examination of Apollo as 
an elenchus. No description of the events in question would seem to support the contention that 
Socrates  employs  his  “standard”  method  of  argumentation  against Apollo.20 Even presuming the 
god has said a fortiori what he believes in the   first   place,   thus   abiding   by   the   “say-what-you-
believe” constraint  of  the  “standard  elenchus,”  it  is  not  at  all  clear what Socrates believes the god 
himself believes. And even if Socrates could get clear about that, he is formally and materially 
denied the possibility of securing agreement from the god on any further beliefs which could 
serve as premises in an argument entailing beliefs contradicting   the   god’s   original  
pronouncement. Finally, as the standard model requires, it is not possible that the god himself 
can be shown that what he says entails such a contradiction. 
 Yet Plato gives every indication in the text that Socrates is about to perform just what it 
seems he cannot do. Clearly, Socrates is made to say he intends to refute the oracle (AP 21c1), 
                                                 
19 See “Certainty  and  Consistency”  (267-8 and passim). 
20 See Vlastos (1983a, 38-39) for the standard account of the elenchus. See Carpenter and Polansky, 
Benson (2000 and 2002), Brickhouse and Smith (2002) for reservations about there being such a standard. 
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using the technical term that identifies his particular method (elenchein)21 and serving notice on 
the pronouncement reported by the god’s  representatives  (to manteion). He also makes clear that 
it is the oracular response itself, personified as tô chrêsmô (AP 21c1-2),22 whom he will show 
(apophanôn, AP 21c1) to be mistaken. And, most importantly, the belief in question is clearly 
relevant to the ethical conduct of life as Socrates conceives it. If the god can be believed to be 
telling the truth, on the face of it, that no one is wiser than Socrates, Socrates would have to 
question his belief in his own ignorance, shaking the ground on which the consistency of all his 
beliefs and his way of life are based. He would be forced to re-evaluate his contribution to the 
well-being of the polis, perhaps taking a more active part in political deliberations, teaching 
those who ask for the benefit of his wisdom, and refraining from practices which threaten to 
remove him from public life. At any rate, he would be forced to change his life. 
 All of this squares with the standard applications of the elenctic procedures.23 It is also 
consistent with the way Socrates often remarks that in the course of the elenchus he himself is 
under examination as much as the interlocutor.24 But the matter is obviously somewhat more 
complex in this case. For if, against the reservations of those who would insist on an elenctic 
standard, the form of the argument here can be described fairly as an elenchus, the content of this 
non-standard argument appears to include elenchi of a more standard sort. Although the 
examinations of the politicians, poets and artisans are not detailed in the dialogue, the results of 
these interrogations are described as including the refutation (exelenchein) of the wisdom of his 
interlocutors (AP 23a3-5) (thus a part of the evaluation of his own relative wisdom); and 
Socrates describes his present activities, including those for which he has been put on trial, as a 
continuation of those first elenchi (AP 23b4-6). Thus, whatever premises are asserted as the basis 
                                                 
21 As Vlastos notes (1983a, 28 and n. 6) the uses of this  verb  and  its  cognate  noun  to  describe  Socrates’  
method proliferate the early dialogues.  
22 See Burnet (1970) 92. 
23 See PR 353b5-6, EU 9c7-8, 15c1-2, REP 335e5, 336a9 for forms of phanein in the elenchus and 
everywhere for the direction of the elenchus against the one who believes he knows. Also see Vlastos 
(1983b).  
24 See CR 46d, CH 166e, PR 333c, GOR 453c. 
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for an elenctic examination  of   the  proposed  belief  about  Apollo’s  pronouncement  on Socrates’  
wisdom are produced in these other elenctic examinations.25 
 This structure of elenctic examination – elenchi tucked inside of a larger, overarching 
elenchus – which we are saying characterize Socrates’   refutation   of   Apollo in the Apology, 
echoes the general structure of Plato’s   Socratic   dialogues whose elenctic accounts of the 
definition of piety, courage, friendship, moderation and the like are derived from several elenctic 
arguments, and it is consistent with our point, here, that the general course of Socrates’   life 
consists in a continual examination of his own life through an examination of others kata ton 
theon, “as befits the god.” 
 Were the beliefs about Socrates’   wisdom   recommended   by   another ordinary citizen, 
Chaerephon, for example, Socrates would examine him directly. In the case where we have an 
elenchus performed on the oracle of Apollo, however, where the god cannot be the interlocutor 
in this examination, who can answer for this belief and for other beliefs which may or may not 
entail  the  refutation  of  the  god’s  response? The only candidate for this position in the elenchus 
under consideration here is Socrates himself. He is, if not the only one, the only one who we are 
told actively questions the apparent meaning of the oracle. Socrates himself says that the truth of 
the oracular pronouncement is inconsistent with the belief that he does not knows anything 
significant, a belief held, so far as we know, by him alone. And what we learn from the Apology 
is that it is just Socrates himself who agrees to those beliefs which ultimately entail the 
contradictory of the  god’s  apparent pronouncement. 
 The only sense to be made of this conflicting evidence is something like the following. 
Socrates believes he is wise in nothing great or small. Chaerephon  reports  that  Apollo  says,  “No 
one is wiser than Socrates.”  Socrates, with everybody else, believes the meaning  of   the   god’s  
words to be, unwarranted as the implication is, that Socrates is wiser than anyone, that is to say, 
Socrates is the wisest.26 
                                                 
25 In   “Certainty   and   Consistency,”   I   argue that elenchi can yield beliefs though not necessarily 
propositions about moral claims. That the results of other elenchi are used as premises in further elenchi is 
consistent with the view that premises in an elenchus do not function as propositions leading to deductive 
(or inductive) conclusions but rather facilitate demonstrations of the inconsistency of interlocutors’  
beliefs. 
26 It is strange that Socrates takes this to be logically entailed by what he reports the Pythia said to 
Chaerephon (AP 21a6-7, mêdena sophôteron einai).   Clearly,   if   “no   one   is   wiser”   than   Socrates,   but  
everyone is exactly as ignorant as Socrates is, then Socrates would not be wisest at all. But Socrates 
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I went to one of those reputed to be wise thinking that here if  anywhere  I  would  refute  the  god’s 
response  and  declare  to  the  oracle,  “This  man  is  wiser than  me,  but  you  said  I  [was  wiser].” (AP 
21b9-c2)   
This   meaning   of   Apollo’s   pronouncement   – Socrates is wiser than anyone – is 
inconsistent   with   Socrates’   long-held belief that he knows nothing. Clearly, he cannot both 
believe that he is wiser than anyone and that he knows nothing great or small, and he needs good 
reasons for giving up either one, in the first case because his belief in his own ignorance is, 
presumably, consistent with a number of other beliefs that have been confirmed by a lifetime of 
elenctic examinations and that he has no reason to doubt at this time, in the other case because he 
believes it is not right for the god to lie. 
 Since it is the only method (if it is a method) he knows, an elenchus is called for to test 
this new belief, but it will clearly be a distinct form of this test. For the test of what Socrates 
believes the  god’s  meaning   to  be  necessarily  entails  an examination of  Socrates’  belief that he 
knows nothing of any importance, and that belief will be vindicated in this elenchus and his 
belief in the apparent meaning of the oracle refuted just in case any one  of  Socrates’  interlocutors  
survives the examination of his reputed wisdom about the right conduct of life.  Having found no 
one among the politicians he examines with any outstanding knowledge in this regard, Socrates 
says he is ready to accept that the oracle cannot be refuted.27 
I want you to consider my adventure as labors someone labors over only for the oracle to prove 
to me quite irrefutable (kai analenktos). (AP 22a6-8)   
He does not immediately say what follows from this apparently failed refutation. 
 What leads Socrates to this conclusion is the failure of the politicians to live up to their 
reputation for wisdom. Socrates has also observed that in one respect at least he has proved wiser 
than any one of these interlocutors. For, Socrates says, after he had decided for himself that these 
                                                                                                                                                             
unhesitantly excludes this middle ground.  It may be that under the influence of the reputation for being a 
“wise   man”   which   motivated   Chaerephon   to   make   his   pilgrimage   in   the   first   place,   and   within   the  
atmosphere  of  sophistical  agnostics  that  characterize  (at  least  Plato’s  accounts  of)  his  dialogues  with  other  
wise men, Socrates takes the comparative to denote   the   superlative.  When  we  answer   the  question,  “Is  
there   a   composer   who   captures   the   musical   nuance   of   incidental   sounds   better   than   John   Cage?”   by  
saying,  “No  one,”  we  do  not  mean  that  there  may  be  composers  who  do  this  just  as  well,  but  rather  that 
Cage is the best. 
27 That   Socrates   suggests   here   that   the   oracle   is   “irrefutable”   (analenktos) suggests strongly that he 
believes he is, or at least has been, conducting an elenchus. Why else would he find his efforts futile to 
this point? 
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men were not as wise as they supposed themselves to be,28 he went on to try to show these same 
interlocutors that they did not know what they thought they did. It was in this part of the 
examination that he incurred the resentment of his interlocutor and of those who witnessed their 
exchange. Socrates, though, finds his way through those interrogations to another, different 
conclusion, one that he could not have anticipated based on his claim to know nothing 
significant. 
And I thought to myself as I walked away that I am wiser than this man. For while neither of us 
knows anything fine or good, he although he does not know thinks he knows something, but I 
since I do not know I do not think [I do]. (AP 22d2-6)   
So Socrates has failed to find among the politicians that interlocutor whose response to 
elenctic examination would vindicate his claim to ignorance. He recommends to the jury, 
therefore, that they take his further attempts to refute the oracle through interrogations of the 
poets and artisans as exercises in futility (AP 22a6-8). Socrates cannot refute what he believes 
Apollo is saying so long as he takes the god to mean that Socrates knows more about what is fine 
and good (kala  k’agatha) or most important (ta megista) than anyone else. Socrates, however, 
cannot consistently believe that this is what the god means and that he knows nothing of any 
significance. Socrates’  examinations of the politicians, poets, and artisans give him no reasons 
yet for believing that he knows anything of any importance. All he has concluded is that he is 
outstanding among his peers for not thinking he knows when he does not know.  How then can 
he reconcile his belief that he knows nothing with the god’s saying that no one is wiser than he? 
Well, he can just in case he questions his belief about  what  Apollo’s  oracle  means.  The 
oracle does not mean what Socrates and everyone else believed it meant at first, that no one is 
wiser than Socrates. In truth, it is the god who is wise. 
And it appears he says “Socrates” only to use my name and make an example (paradeigma) of 
me, as if to  say  that,  “This  man  among  you,  people,  is  wisest  who like Socrates grasps (egnôken) 
that he is truly worth nothing  with  respect  to  wisdom.” (AP 23a7-b4) 
                                                 
28 Socrates says only  “it  seems  to  me”  (edoxe moi) (AP 21c5) that these men were not as wise as many 
other and that man himself thought him to be. These beliefs of his in the ignorance of his interlocutors, 
gained elenctically, are what turn up as premises in the overall elenchus directed against the literal 
meaning   of   god’s   oracle.   These   beliefs   are   not   secured   as   truths   but   are   nonetheless   beliefs   Socrates  
comes away from his examinations with.  Vlastos (1985, 7) has suggested that what is crucial about the 
premises in any elenchus is that Socrates believes them.  
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On this interpretation, “Socrates”  merely  stands, in the oracular formulation, for the one 
who counts as wisest among his peers because he recognizes how   badly   what   he   “knows”  
compares with the knowledge of the god. And  Socrates  himself  is  “wise”  not  because  he  knows  
anything more or more significant than anyone else but because he recognizes just how little 
what  he  “knows”  is  worth  and  that  he  does  not  know. 
 This rendering of the pronouncement by Apollo can be believed by Socrates just because 
the saying is consistent with the belief in his own ignorance that Socrates still has no good reason 
for rejecting, and, perhaps, now we can now see why. If Socrates, all along, has held up as his 
standard of knowledge the exacting certitude of Apollo’s  divine  wisdom,  no  victory  in argument 
over his human interlocutors has won him the privilege of claiming to know anything or to be 
wise at all.29 Still, Socrates has to find a way to square his convictions about his ignorance with 
his belief in the verity of   the  god’s  proclamation.  By overturning the apparent meaning of the 
oracular response, that Socrates is truly wise, Apollo is refuted and vindicated at once, and in the 
process of examining this divine sign, Socrates’  conviction  in  his  own  ignorance  is  strengthened  
by surviving another elenctic test. 
 Ironically, of course, it is the apparent meaning of the  god’s  pronouncement  that  convicts  
Socrates at his trial. Socrates alone is unable to believe, finally, that the god could mean to say 
that no one is wiser than he. It is through the very examinations he conducts to refute that 
apparent reading of the Delphic oracle, Socrates explains, that he came to gain, along with a 
wretched  reputation,  the  moniker  “sophos”  that we might translate as “wise  guy.” 
From these investigations, men of Athens, much hostility of a most painful and oppressive sort 
has accrued against me and so from them many malicious thoughts including this name I am 
called,  “sophos.” (AP 22e6-23a5)   
Even after his death, Socrates predicts, others will say he is wise even though he says he 
is not. 
For they will say I am wise, even if I am not, these people who want to criticize you. (AP 38c3-
4)   
                                                 
29 See Vlastos (1985, 11-20) on the distinction between elenctically justifiable knowledge and certain 
knowledge. Vlastos argues that the Socrates of the early dialogues traffics in the former exclusively. 
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And so, to all appearances, Socrates fails to truly refute Apollo. In a very important and 
fatal sense, he fails to overturn the apparent meaning of the god’s  pronouncement in the minds of 
his contemporaries in favor of an alternative rendering of that same message that squares with 
his long held beliefs about his ignorance. As a result of   this  “failed”  elenchus, he is convicted 
and sentenced to die. 
In the end, the Athenians seem rather the more   persuaded   that   Socrates’   claims   to  
ignorance are mere dissembling and that Socrates ought to be held accountable for what they 
think he knows. This, of course, allows his detractors to connect him more directly to formal 
charges of pedagogic malpractice in  the  case  of  the  young  men  and  of  such  “meddling”30 in those 
concerns of the natural scientists thought to endanger civic piety. It is at best, then, only some 
small consolation that there is a philosophical sense in which Socrates successfully “refutes” the 
god. By an alternative, examined interpretation of   Apollo’s oracle, Socrates demonstrates his 
piety for the gods at the same time as he saves from elenctic refutation his belief in the relative 
worthlessness of what he knows. The overall consistency of his beliefs as well as his ethical 
character are, on these terms, both vindicated. 
 It is a virtue of the elenchus performed on the meaning of Apollo’s   response   to  
Chaerephon   that   it   highlights   how   Socrates’ own beliefs are implicated and tested whenever 
beliefs are tested elenctically. It is often taken  for  granted  how  Socrates’  beliefs about what an 
interlocutor himself believes figure into the elenchus and are always subject to revision. When 
the interlocutor can answer   for   himself,   this   contingency   is   addressed   by   the   “say-what-you-
believe”  constraint  which  functions  to  settle  the  question  about  what  Socrates  can  believe  about  
the interlocutor’s statements before the examination begins. When the belief in question 
concerns a divine sign, however, Socrates shows that he is ready to forward and test his own 
beliefs about what this sign signifies in the course of the examination itself. We may even be 
tempted to say Socrates takes what is generally believed to be the apparent meaning of  Apollo’s 
pronouncement as a basis or excuse for his examinations of the politicians, poets, and artisans, 
and that he alters his method as well as his reading only when forced by results of these 
                                                 
30 A rendering of phrontistês (AP 18b7) along the lines of  “giving  greater attention than is warranted”. 
On the Attic ear for phrontizein (more  widely  respected  as  “thinking”  in  Ionia)  see  the  gloss  by  Burnet  
(76). 
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examinations that fail to square with the supposition that the god means to say that Socrates is 
truly wise. 
 Additionally, this elenctic examination of Apollo underscores just how Socrates’  interest  
in testing a belief is aroused by its failure to fit with beliefs he already holds. Because of the 
premium Socrates places on the consistency of his beliefs, and because he accepts as believable 
only what can be justified by elenctic testing,31 he cannot permit himself the luxury of a neutral 
stance on the beliefs of others. He must test every and only those beliefs which are inconsistent 
with the set of beliefs he currently ascribes to, because to accept those beliefs as credible for 
another is tantamount to acknowledging their claim against the identity formed by the imputed 
consistency of his own beliefs. If a fellow citizen, with a shared stock  of beliefs, takes 
something to be true that Socrates believes is false, the elenchus will expose the inconsistency of 
the beliefs of one or the other of them. Spared elenctic testing, each is in danger of living in 
conflict with the other as well as with himself. Who he is and his ethical bearing in the world are 
potentially inconsistent. Thus, if Socrates himself, as well as his interlocutor, is said to undergo 
examination in every elenctic test, it is never Socrates nor the interlocutor himself who stand to 
be refuted by these examination, but the ethical character they have become on the basis of the 
more or less consistent beliefs they hold. If the interlocutor Socrates refutes in every other early 
dialogue would amend his beliefs, he would amend his life. What we learn from the Apology is 
that when the beliefs in question concern a proclamation by a god, the refutation of those beliefs 
can only consist in clarifying how those beliefs fit an exemplary form of life, one, for example, 
in which lying is not themis for a god or a man. 
 Further, the examination of the divine sign,  Apollo’s  oracle, in the Apology suggests that 
the Socratic elenchus can not be limited to one test with any particular interlocutor. We see this 
in the way Socrates’  refutation  of  Apollo  encompasses  testing of all those who happen to have a 
reputation for wisdom. What   there   is   to   conclude  about  Apollo’s  oracle   is an inference drawn 
from the examination of a great plurality of interlocutors and beliefs held up against the proposed 
consistency of a particular set of beliefs encapsulated in the well-known recommendation: 
                                                 
31 See Vlastos (1983a, 1985).  
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…   this   really   is   the   greatest   good   for human being, each day to hold discussions concerning 
virtue and the other subjects about which you have heard me discoursing and examining myself 
and others, …  the  unexamined  life  is  not  worth  living  … (AP 38a2-6)   
The elenchus is a way of life for Socrates. All his beliefs hinge on it, and he can no more 
give up testing his beliefs and those of his interlocutors than he can give up the principal belief 
that he knows nothing of any importance. If the only knowledge he has is a function of the 
elenctic examination of beliefs that are inconsistent with those held by him which have survived 
elenctic testing, then no belief can stand independently of further testing, not even if it originates 
with the gods. 
 In conclusion, then, there are no good reasons for privileging   divinations   in   Socrates’  
case except to say that Socrates believes there is some truth in them. What that truth is, however, 
will always be subject to testing and interpretation. And since those interpretations can only issue 
from human beings and not the gods, beliefs in what these divinations mean, whenever they refer 
to claims about the ethical conduct of life, can always be the subject of an elenctic examination. 
Beliefs in what divine signs mean would seem to be as subject to examination as Socrates says, 
elsewhere, that beliefs about the meaning of poetry are.32 While it is likely that both have many 
fine and true things to say, their meanings cannot be known with certainty immediately but must 
be subject to an examination, and the only examination Socrates considers adequate to the task is 
the elenchus.33 
 On this reading of Socrates’  mission,   his   interests   are   in  what   he   can   know  within   the  
limits defined by the larger parameters adduced by him from the divine proclamation of his 
“wisdom.” What Socrates gains through his examinations is a refined and reinforced consistency 
of the beliefs he holds which appears to warrant Socrates nothing more or less than what he 
needs to make him happy. Whether this same psychic condition would make anyone else happy 
would seem to depend on whether anyone could care for their soul in a way that would make an 
                                                 
32 Whatever poets may say literally, their meaning is never entirely clear even to the poets themselves. 
Burnet cites the reference to the Ion (533e5) and Meno (99c2) for the possession that inspires the poets to 
say  “many   fine   things”  and   the  suggestion  (MENO 99c3-4) that hê manteion are likewise so possessed 
when  they  say  “fine  things”  and  even  “truths.” 
33 Socrates does in fact subject what the poets say to elenctic examination at REP 331d-333c, for example, 
where  Simonides’  statement  that  “justice  is  giving  to  each  his  due”  is  said  to  be  “riddling,”  just  what  he  
had said about the definition Charmides remembers, Critias attributes to Hesiod, and Socrates refutes, that 
sophrôsunê is  “doing  your  own  business”  (CH 162a10-b1). 
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examined life matter to them.  This is just the care Socrates gives his own soul, and his 
“refutation” of Apollo is consistent with that effort. 
 
 
John M Carvalho  
Villanova University  
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